TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/030491/0304992.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 5.4 KB | 123 lines

                                                                                THE GULF WAR, Page 37

THE PRISONERS

The Fruits of Interrogation


Questioning the growing number of Iraqi captives has reaped
information that eludes even high-tech satellites

By JESSE BIRNBAUM -- Reported by Lara Marlowe/Riyadh and Frank
Melville/London


    Much of the success of the coalition's war against Iraq
stems from excellent intelligence from spy satellites and other
high-tech gear. But much is also the result of good,
old-fashioned, low-tech intelligence work: interrogating EPWs,
enemy prisoners of war (POW is now a term reserved for allied
troops who are captured by the Iraqis).

    From the first trickle of Iraqi soldiers who deserted or
were taken prisoner in the early days of the conflict to the
hundreds rounded up last week, intelligence officers have
amassed files of valuable information. They have learned of
eroding Iraqi morale brought on by heavy bombing; of shortages
of food, water and other supplies; about the disposition,
strength and fighting ability of Iraqi forces; and about the
nature and the quality of their weaponry.

    Some of this information is collected by targeting specific
types of Iraqi soldiers who are most likely to have the kind
of knowledge that the allies need. U.S. Rangers and members of
Britain's crack Special Air Service have made forays deep into
Iraqi territory with "shopping lists" -- engineers or artillery
officers, for example, who have special information about enemy
plans and operations.

    Soldiers captured by the British units informed the allies
that before the war started, Iraq distributed substantial
supplies of chemical weapons along the front lines to be held
for the ground war. The British also learned that Iraqi gunners
were suffering from serious maintenance problems and had great
difficulty getting spare parts, and that Iraqi helicopters had
randomly sown anti-personnel mines along the front to harass
advancing troops.

    "Collecting information from prisoners is a winnowing
process," says an American officer. The U.S. rates prisoners
A through C for the value of their knowledge, and 1 through 3
for their willingness to talk. About 1 in 4 of the more than
2,000 EPWs are defectors. Many braved threats of execution or
reprisals against their families at home and had to thread
through minefields to reach coalition forces.

    Most of the Iraqi prisoners are conscripts or enlisted men
of low rank, in their 20s. About 5% are low-ranking officers;
the highest is an infantry lieutenant colonel. But none are
from Saddam's most formidable unit, the 150,000-man Republican
Guard. From interrogating these soldiers, usually through
volunteer Kuwaiti interpreters, the allies have developed a
richly detailed picture of the Iraqi army's condition. Items:

    -- EPWs have told interrogators that their company
commanders were held directly accountable for desertions and
that all troops were forced to sign an oath promising not to
defect. Some EPWs told of seeing fellow soldiers hanged by
loyalist execution squads and left suspended as a warning to
would-be runaways.

    -- Many Iraqi troops are ill-trained, ill-armed and
ill-prepared. Says a U.S. officer: "These guys were not in the
war for the long haul. Some have had as little as six weeks'
military training. Others are veterans of the Iran-Iraq war."
Those, adds the officer, are particularly war-weary.

    -- Troops have gone for months without hearing from their
families, and most have become depressed by isolation. Some
EPWs report that they were forbidden to have portable radios.

    -- Soldiers complain that their commanders lied to them,
saying they were three days from the Saudi border when they
were only three hours away. The distance was presumably
exaggerated to discourage would-be defectors from heading
south.

    -- Iraqi commanders have also duped their troops into
thinking they would be shot by the Americans if they
surrendered or defected. Intelligence officers believe that
this may explain why the great majority turned themselves in
to Arab coalition forces rather than U.S. units.

    -- Not all EPWs feel defeated. "We find some really
incorrigible hardball types," says the American officer. "We
were very impressed by the tenacity of the Iraqis who fought
at Khafji."

    Despite the general satisfaction over the results of
prisoner interrogation, U.S. officers feel hamstrung by rules
laid down by their Saudi colleagues. The Saudis do not permit
American intelligence teams to question Iraqis who were
captured by Arab troops. Defectors, say the Saudis, are
"guests" and "Arab brothers" -- and all EPWs are considered
hajis, religious pilgrims to Mecca, and are to be treated
accordingly.

    The Saudis do their own interrogation of these "guests" and
pass along worthwhile information to the allies. The Americans
are allowed only to submit written questions to the Saudis for
the Iraqi prisoners. But the Americans complain that the Saudis
fail to ask follow-up questions and are slow in providing
transcripts of their interviews.

    U.S. intelligence officers say that this is only a small
problem now. But it could get bigger. The Saudis have built
detention camps that will house 200,000 EPWs. If a ground war
goes as well as allied commanders hope, that may not be nearly
enough.